> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://vayl.gitbook.io/vayl-docs/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://vayl.gitbook.io/vayl-docs/documentation/reference/mcp-tools/compliance-gdpr.md). # Compliance (GDPR) Erase, export, and expire personal data, with signed erasure receipts. These four tools cover data-subject rights: erasure (Art. 17), access and portability (Art. 15/20), and storage limitation (Art. 5(1)(e)). Erasures are hard deletes, history included, and each one that erases something issues a signed receipt you can check with [`verify_receipt`](/vayl-docs/documentation/reference/mcp-tools/accountability.md#verify_receipt). All four take the memory-space arguments `user_id="default"`, `agent_id=""`, `run_id=""`. Outputs below were captured by running the tools offline. | Tool | Capability | Annotations | | --------------- | ------------------------ | ----------- | | `delete` | `delete` (admin, member) | destructive | | `delete_all` | `admin` | destructive | | `export_memory` | `read` | read-only | | `purge_expired` | `admin` | destructive | {% hint style="info" %} **`forget` or `delete`?** [`forget`](/vayl-docs/documentation/reference/mcp-tools/memory.md#forget) retires a fact and keeps it in history: use it when something stopped being true. `delete` removes every trace: use it when the data must go. {% endhint %} ## delete ```python delete(subject: str, user_id: str = "default", agent_id: str = "", run_id: str = "") -> str ``` Permanently erases every record of `subject` in the space, including history and retraction tombstones. The erased values are also redacted from any decision snapshots for that subject (the snapshots are re-signed), and a signed erasure receipt is issued. ```json {"name": "delete", "arguments": {"subject": "refund_window", "user_id": "cust_5521"}} ``` ``` Erased 1 record(s) for 'refund_window'; redacted its values from 1 decision snapshot(s). signed erasure receipt #3 issued — verify with verify_receipt #3 (or independently with the public key from export_public_key). ``` When nothing matches, it returns `No records found for 'refund_window'.` and issues no receipt; the request is still recorded in the audit log. ## delete\_all ```python delete_all(user_id: str = "default", agent_id: str = "", run_id: str = "") -> str ``` Permanently erases memory, history included. With `agent_id` and `run_id` both empty, it erases **every space** of `user_id` (account deletion) and redacts values from all that user's decision snapshots. Pass `agent_id` or `run_id` to erase one space only. ``` Erased all memory for 'patient_42' (4 record(s)). signed erasure receipt #5 issued — verify with verify_receipt #5. ``` When snapshots were redacted, the count line adds `; values redacted from N decision snapshot(s)`. {% hint style="warning" %} **Erasure fails closed with the graph on.** With `VAYL_GRAPH` enabled, `delete` and `delete_all` purge the Neo4j graph first. If the graph can't be reached, the call stops before touching the store: nothing is erased, no receipt is issued, and you get the generic `Vayl couldn't complete that (ref …)` message. The server log records a `RuntimeError` under that ref; the full text (`erasure aborted: graph purge failed and nothing was erased`) is logged at DEBUG and kept in the encrypted metrics store. Retry once the graph is back. {% endhint %} ## export\_memory ```python export_memory(user_id: str = "default", agent_id: str = "", run_id: str = "") -> str ``` Returns everything held about a space as JSON, for a subject access or portability request: every statement (active and history), plus the decision snapshots, audit entries (up to 1,000 each) and receipts for that `user_id` in the caller's tenant. Needs only `read`, and is scope-checked like any read. The export itself is audited. ```json { "space": {"user_id": "cust_5521", "agent_id": "", "run_id": ""}, "count": 1, "records": [ {"id": 1, "subject": "refund_window", "value": "30 days", "scope": "global", "status": "ACTIVE", "supersedes": null, "confidence": 0.95, "metadata": null} ], "decisions": [ {"id": 1, "ts": "2026-09-26T12:20:13+00:00", "user_id": "cust_5521", "agent_id": "", "run_id": "", "summary": "Issued refund to order #91", "beliefs": [{"confidence": 0.95, "id": 1, "set_at": 1790425213.58, "source": "policy-bot", "status": "ACTIVE", "subject": "refund_window", "supersedes": null, "value": "30 days"}], "entry_hash": "7d5bb151…", "anchor": "a1a125e0…", "signed": true, "verified": true} ], "audit": [ {"ts": "2026-09-26T12:20:13+00:00", "user_id": "cust_5521", "agent_id": "", "run_id": "", "action": "record_decision", "detail": "Issued refund to order #91", "tenant": "default"}, {"ts": "2026-09-26T12:20:13+00:00", "user_id": "cust_5521", "agent_id": "", "run_id": "", "action": "remember", "detail": "[policy-bot] ADD refund_window", "tenant": "default"} ], "receipts": [] } ``` The real output is indented JSON; it is condensed here, with hashes shortened. ## purge\_expired ```python purge_expired(older_than_days: int, user_id: str = "default", agent_id: str = "", run_id: str = "", include_audit: bool = False, include_decisions: bool = False, include_receipts: bool = False) -> str ``` Hard-deletes statements written more than `older_than_days` days ago for `user_id` (all of its spaces, or the one space named by `agent_id`/`run_id`). ``` Purged 0 record(s) older than 365 days. ``` {% hint style="danger" %} **The `include_*` flags aren't limited to `user_id`.** `include_decisions` and `include_receipts` purge those tables for the caller's whole tenant. `include_audit` deletes old audit rows across the whole deployment, because the audit log is one chain shared by every tenant. ``` Purged 0 record(s) older than 3650 days. Also purged: decisions=0, receipts=0. ``` {% endhint %} Only the deployment operator (an admin of the `default` tenant, including the local stdio admin) may pass `include_audit=True`. Anyone else gets this, and the attempt is audited: ``` Access denied: the audit log is shared by every tenant, so only the deployment operator may purge it (include_audit). ``` `include_audit=True` deletes from the head of the audit chain and writes a signed retention anchor, so `verify_audit` keeps passing on the rows that remain. Deleted audit entries are gone for good; export them first if you must keep them. ## Next steps

:file-signature: Accountability

Verify the signed erasure receipts these tools issue.Accountability

:lock: Authentication & access

The delete and admin capabilities these tools require.Authentication and access

:sliders: Configuration

VAYL_GRAPH, encryption, and the other settings erasure depends on.Configuration